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Abstract
The problem of incentives for correct revelation in a collective decision
model is presented as a game with incomplete information. Two approaches to incomplete information are used, a ﬁrst where the individual
beliefs are not introduced and a second where they are. In the ﬁrst approach it is recalled that the mechanisms for which the solution to the
incentive problem is in dominant strategies lead in general to a budgetary
problem for the central agency. For these mechanisms a uniqueness property is demonstrated. In the second approach it is shown that if a compatibility condition is imposed on the individual beliefs and if a Bayesian
solution is given to the incentive problem, then it is possible to avoid the
budgetary problem.

1

Introduction

In a collective decision context, a selection rule may be called decentralized if
it relies, at least partially, on the information that each individual participant
holds. With such a rule, some participant may ﬁnd in his self-interest to distort
the information on which is based the selection, in a way undetectable by the
others.
Historically this incentive problem has been brought up in the theory of Public Expenditure and Taxation [see Wicksell (1896), Lindhal (1919) and Samuelson (1969)] and was also considered, more or less explicitly, in some discussions
concerning the Lange-Lerner economic model. However, as well established by
Hurwicz (1972), this problem may arise for any collective decision rule preserving some kind of informational decentralization.
In this paper we shall argue that the problem of incentives for correct revelation should be viewed as a game with incomplete information [see Harsanyi
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(1967-1968)]. That it could be viewed as a game was already recognized by
Samuelson (1969) and non-cooperative game-theoretic concepts were introduced
by Drèze-de la Vallée Poussin (1971) and Hurwicz (1971). In section 2, we shall
in fact introduce two appraoches to incomplete information. The ﬁrst approach,
which does not take explicitly into account the partial information that each
participant may have concerning the others, is developed in section 3. The results presented there are typically based on a class of transfer schemes among
participants with a strong incentive property, which was analyzed by several
authors and which leads in general to the budgetary problem of balancing the
transfers. In section 4, the second approach, in which the participants’ beliefs
concerning each other are introduced, provides a particular way for solving the
budget problem whenever these beliefs satisfy a compatibility condition and
only a Bayesian incentive property is required.

2

The Model

2.1

The basic collective decision problem

We shall consider a set N of n individual agents or players plus a special agent
called the central agency. To deﬁne the collective decision problem, let us assume that there exists a subset X of Rm describing all possible physical outcomes
for the individual agents and which form the set of alternatives.1 Assume also
the existence of a commodity called money. The choice of an outcome x ∈ X
is supposed to be the responsibility of the central agency which has to deﬁne
simultaneously a vector y = (y1 , · · · , yi , · · · , yn ) ∈ Rn of monetary transfers for
all individual agents. In the process of selecting an outcome and of deﬁning a
vector of transfers the central agency is restricted by the ‘a priori information
speciﬁcations’ and by the rules of a given ‘mechanism’.

2.2

The a priori information assumptions

Each individual agent i ∈ N is supposed to be described by a k-dimensional
vector of characteristics belonging to Rk . When αi is the value of agent i’s
characteristics, we say that agent i is of type αi . Furthermore, to each agent
i ∈ N , we associate a function Vi (·; αi ) from Rm+1 to R such that Vi (x, yi ; αi )
denotes the payoﬀ, for player i, in the situation where x ∈ X is the outcome
selected and yi ∈ R is his monetary transfer. For the following, we shall actually
restrict to the case where, for every i ∈ N , there exists a real-valued function2
Ui (·; αi ) such that, for every x ∈ X and every yi ∈ R:
1 The set X may actually be interpreted as being the set of outcomes associated to joint
strategies in a game or in an ‘organization form’ as deﬁned by Groves (1975). It may also
be the set of all ‘possible public projects’ in a public good allocation problem as studied by
Green-Laﬀont (1976).
2 Functions

Ui are interpreted, according to the model considered, as utilities or proﬁts.
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Vi (x, yi ; αi ) = Ui (x; αi ) + yi .
This separability requirement amounts, in game-theoretic terms, to admit unrestricted side-payments with full-tranferability.
In decentralized contexts, to which we want to restrict our attention, it is
supposed that every agent has incomplete information concerning the types αi ,
except his own type, which is his private information. Indeed we assume that
every agent only knows that the type αi of any other agent i belongs to some
space Ai ⊆ Rk , which is the space of description of all possible types of agent
i. All the sets Ai are assumed to be of common knowledge,3 in the Aumann
(1975) sense, meaning that no agent can consciously disagree on what they are.
Furthermore we assume that the functions Vi and Ui are respectively deﬁned
on X × R × Ai and X × Ai and are of common knowledge. In the language
of probability theory, the type of agent i is for every other agent a random
phenomenon and Ai is its sample space.
In this incomplete information framework, we introduce strategic considerations by allowing some kind of communication process between the agents.
Speciﬁcally we assume that each agent i has to announce to the other agents
some type ai ∈ Rk as being his own type αi . We shall call such an announcement by agent i a message of agent i. Moreover, as a plausibility condition,
we shall require that every individual message ai belongs to the space Ai of
possible types. Hence Ai is both the ith sample space and the message space of
individual i.

2.3

Deﬁnition of a mechanism

Let {Ai ; i ∈ N } be a given family of sets of messages of the individual agents.
We will denote by A = ×i∈N Ai the set of all n-tuples a = (a1 , · · · , an ) of
individual messages and by A−i = ×j∈N,j=i Ai the set of all (n − 1)-tuples
(a1 , · · · , ai−1 , ai+1 , · · · , an ) of individual messages. Before sending any message
to the central agency each individual agent is supposed to know the mechanism
ruling the agency behavior. Formally, we call mechanism any function m = (d, t)
from A to X × Rn where:
1. d is a function from A to X called decision rule and such that d(a) = x is
the outcome selected by the central agency whenever a ∈ A is the n-tuple
of messages received from the individual agents.
2. t is a function from A to Rn called transfer scheme and such that t(a) =
(t1 (a), · · · , tn (a)) is the vector of individual transfer yi = ti (a) determined
by the central agency whenever a ∈ A is the n-tuple of messages received
from the individual agents.
3 Clearly

player i’s payoﬀ function is fully known only when his type αi is known.
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In the following, we shall restrict the set of all possible mechanisms to a
certain admissible subset M . A ﬁrst requirement for M that we shall use in
most results is an outcome eﬃciency requirement:


def
Ui (x∗ ; ai ) = max
Ui (x; ai )}.
∀a ∈ A, d(a) ∈ P(a) = {x∗ ∈ X :
i∈N

x∈X

i∈N

For any m (or d) satisfying this condition we shall say that m (or d) is outcome
eﬃcient.
In order for such a requirement to be meaningful, we shall impose one of the
following alternative regularity hypotheses:

H1 : X is compact and ∀a ∈ A, i∈N Ui (·; ai ) is upper semicontinuous on X.

H2 : X is open convex and ∀a ∈ A, i∈N Ui (·; ai ) is a diﬀerentiable strictly
concave function having a critical point in X.
Condition H1 implies that, for every a ∈ A, P(a) = ∅ and condition H2
ensures in addition that P(a) is single-valued. Other conditions could be used.

2.4

The communication game: Alternative approaches to
incomplete information

Suppose that a mechanism m ∈ M has been chosen and that α ∈ A is the
n-tuple of the individual agents’ types. A communication process between the
individual agents and the center can be formalized as an n-person game in
normal form4 conditional to α ∈ A. In this game, the strategy space of each
i ∈ N is his message space Ai . Given α ∈ A, the payoﬀ functions are:
∀i ∈ N , ∀a ∈ A, Wim (a; αi )

def
= Vi (m(a); αi )
= Ui (d(a); αi ) + ti (a).

Thus, for every α ∈ A, we have the normal form game:
Γm (α) = {{Ai ; i ∈ N }, {Wim (·; αi ); i ∈ N }}.
However, because of the incomplete information framework, every player
ignores what game Γm (α) is to be played. Hence, when he wants to characterize
the behavior of any other player j, player i must consider not only what message
aj player j announces but also what type αj could be player j’s true type.
This consideration is essential in the formulation of the incentive problem
that will be examined in the subsequent sections. Indeed the question will
be to determine whether every player has interest to reveal his true type. In
4 See

Luce and Raiﬀa (1957, p. 157).
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this context, every player may want to characterize, for every other player, the
particular behavior consisting in revealing his true type.
For this reason, we shall introduce a more sophisticated strategy concept.
For every i, we introduce the notion of a normalized strategy of player i to be
a decision rule a∗i associating a unique strategy choice to each of his possible
types. Formally a∗i is a function from Ai to Ai . We denote A∗i the set of all
admissible normalized strategies for i. The strategy, consisting in declaring the
true value of his parameter in the communication game, is a normalized strategy
for each player.
Now to treat the incentive problem we shall distinguish two appraoches,
each one associated to a diﬀerent deﬁnition of the communication process. The
ﬁrst approach, treated in section 3, considers that, for every player i ∈ N , the
other players’ space of types A−i is a space of states of nature for which player
i satisﬁes, as a decision-maker, the ‘complete ignorance’ postulate [Luce and
Raiﬀa (1957, p.294)]. Let, for m ∈ M , G(m) = {{Γm (α); α ∈ A}, {A∗i ; i ∈ N }}.
According to the ﬁrst approach, all the games belonging to G(m) have to be
considered simultaneously by all agents, i.e. by the players and by the central
agency, for every matter related to the mechanism m ∈ M . Consequently, we
say of G(m) that it is the standard form of the communication game associated
to the mechanism m ∈ M under the complete ignorance postulate.
The second approach, treated in section 4, considers that every player i,
whatever his type αi ∈ Ai , has some ‘beliefs’ concerning the others types. We
shall assume5 that the beliefs of player i are represented by a real-valued function
pi deﬁned over B−i × Ai , where B−i is the Borel σ-algebra on A−i , and such
that for every αi ∈ Ai , pi (·|αi ) is a probability on (A−i , B−i ) with full support.
All functions pi are of common knowledge. However, player i beliefs are fully
known only when his type αi ∈ Ai is also known.
In this model, we may associate to a mechanism m ∈ M not only the family
G(m) of games, but also the family {pi ; i ∈ N } of beliefs. We get the standard
form of the communication game associated to the mechanism m ∈ M under
the (Bayesian) probabilistic postulate 6 which may be denoted:
Γ(m) = {{Γm (α), α ∈ A}, {a∗i ; i ∈ N }, {pi ; i ∈ N }}.
The basic diﬀerence with the complete ignorance framework is that players have
now beliefs about which one is the true game in G(m). Notice that the central
agency, which is not a player, does not have any beliefs.
5 In section 4, we shall see that some additional assumptions should be put on these functions pi like requiring that pi (·|αi ) be discrete or, more generally, that pi be a transition
probability between the spaces (Ai , Bi ) and (A−i , B−i ) [see Neveu (1970, p.69)], where Bi is
the Borel σ-algebra on Ai .
6 As introduced by Harsanyi (1967-1968, Part I, p.72). Notice that Γ(m) is not a normal
form game.
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Incentives under the Complete Ignorance Postulate

Let us consider ﬁrst the case where the incomplete information game which
formalizes the communication process associated to a mechanism m ∈ M is
deﬁned under the (nonprobabilitic) complete ignorance postulate.
The study of the solution of the incentive problem will result from the analysis of the behavior of the players in the game G(m).

3.1

Incentive and strongly incentive compatible mechanisms

Take any mechanism m ∈ M and consider the communication game G(m) associated to m under the complete ignorance postulate. For notational convenience
we let: ∀a ∈ Rnk , ∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ Rk ,
(ai , a−i ) = (a1 , · · · , ai−1 , ai , ai+1 , · · · , an ),
A∗

=

A∗−i

=

× A∗i , a∗ (α) = (a∗1 (α1 ), a∗1 (α2 ), · · · , a∗n (αn )),

i∈N

× A∗j , a∗−i (α−i ) = (a∗1 (α1 ), · · · , a∗i−1 (αi−1 ), a∗i+1 (αi+1 ), · · · , a∗n (αn )).

j∈N
j=i

We say that an n-tuple of normalized strategies a∗ ∈ A∗ is a Nash Equilibrium
(locally) for some α ∈ A if and only if a∗ (α) is a Nash Equilibrium for the game
Γm (α), i.e.
∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ Ai , Wim (ai , a∗−i (α−i ); αi ) ≤ Wim (a∗ (α); αi ).
An n-tuple a∗ ∈ A∗ is a uniform equilibrium if and only if it is a Nash equilibrium
for every possible α ∈ A. It is clear now that the notion of normalized strategy
is needed here so that each player can characterize the behavior of the others.
We denote by E(m) the subset of A∗ of all uniform equilibria for the game
G(m).
With these notions we are able to deﬁne a ﬁrst solution concept to the
incentive problem (due primarily to Hurwicz (1972)). Deﬁne the particular
normalized strategy â∗i for player i by
∀αi ∈ Ai , â∗i (αi ) = αi .
This is the normalized strategy, for player i, consisting in always revealing his
true type. We say that the mechanism m is (locally) incentive compatible for
some α ∈ A if and only if â∗ is a Nash equilibrium for that α. Of course one is
generally interested to show that this local property holds for a large subset of
A. For this reason, we say that a mechanism m is incentive compatible if and
only if it is incentive compatible for every α ∈ A, i.e. α̂∗ ∈ E(m).
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Some authors7 have introduced a stronger concept of incentive compability.
To introduce this other concept we recall that a dominant strategy for any
player i for a game Γm (α) is a strategy ai ∈ Ai such that:
∀a−i ∈ A−i , ∀ai ∈ Ai , Wim (ai , a−i ; αi ) ≤ Wim (ai , a−i ; αi ).
We say that an n-tuple a∗ ∈ A∗ , is a dominant uniform equilibrium if and only
if, for every α ∈ A, every a∗i (αi ) is a dominant strategy for player i. We denote
by ED (m) the subset of A∗ of all dominant uniform equilibria for the game
G(m). Then we may say that a mechanism m is strongly incentive compatible
if and only if â∗ ∈ ED (m).
It is clear that this concept of incentive compatibility is stronger than the
previous one, since, for every mechanism m, ED (m) ⊆ E(m). However under
the plausibility condition we have introduced we get:
Theorem 1. Any mechanism m ∈ M is strongly incentive compatible if and
only if it is incentive compatible.
Proof: We only prove suﬃciency. If m ∈ M is incentive compatible we may
write:
∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀α−i ∈ A−i , ∀ai ∈ Ai , Wim (ai , â∗−i (α−i ); αi ) ≤ Wim (â∗ (α); αi ).
This implies:
∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀a−i ∈ A−i , ∀ai ∈ Ai , Wim (ai , a−i ; αi ) ≤ Wim (αi , a−i ; αi ).
i.e., m is strongly incentive compatible.

3.2

A class of strongly incentive compatible mechanisms
and the budget problem

We say of a mechanism m ∈ M that it is a distribution mechanism if and only
if the transfer scheme is such that:

Uj (d(a); aj ) − fi (a),
∀i ∈ N , ∀a ∈ A, ti (a) =
j∈N
j=i

where fi is, for every i ∈ N , a real-valued function deﬁned over A. In this
case player i ∈ N receives
from (pays to) the central agency the diﬀerence

between the amounts
j∈N,j=i Uj (d(a); aj ) and fi (a) both deﬁned in terms
of the declared types and of the corresponding decision rule. The n-tuple
(f1 , · · · , fi , · · · , fn ) is a distribution rule. In particular, a distribution rule is
said to be discretionary if and only if:
7 See, for instance, Groves (1973, 1975), Groves and Loeb (1975) and Green and Laﬀont
(1976).
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∀i ∈ N , ∀a−i ∈ A−i , ∀ai ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai , fi (ai , a−i ) = fi (ai , a−i ).
In that case, for every player, the distribution rule is constant with respect to
the message that the player sends to the agency. Accordingly, we shall say of
a mechanism that it is a discretionary mechanism whenever it is a distribution
mechanism with discretionary distribution rule.
We are interested by mechanisms which are simultaneously outcome eﬃcient
and discretionary. (They are sometimes called Groves-mechanisms.8 ) The reason for restricting to this class of mechanisms is that it turns out to coincide
with the class of strongly incentive mechanisms. More precisely, we have the
characteristization resulting from the next two theorems:9
Theorem 2. (a) If H1 holds, then any mechanism which is outcome eﬃcient
and discretionary is strongly incentive compatible. (b) If H2 holds, any mechanism which is strongly incentive compatible and outcome eﬃcient is discretionary.
Note that, by theorem 1, theorem 2 characterizes also incentive compatible
mechanisms.
The above result is clearly due to the structure of the transfers in a discretionary mechanism. However these transfers are made through the budget of
the central agency. Hence, an important consideration is to know whether the
structure of the transfers makes it possible for the agency to balance its budget.
More generally we shall say that a mechanism m = (d, t) is budget balancing if
and only if:

ti (·) ≡ 0.
i∈N

The question is therefore to know whether an outcome eﬃcient discretionary
mechanism can be budget balancing. However, as noted in Groves-Loeb (1975)
the answer is often negative10 except when the utility functions are of a particular quadratic type.
In Groves-Ledyard (1975) model of a general equilibrium economy with public goods, where the utility functions are not supposed to be separable but in
which the agents are only required to communicate marginal willingness to pay
functions, the budget problem is similarly treated by quadratic approximation.
8 This terminology which is used by Green-Laﬀont (1975) and (1976) is based on Groves
(1973) and Groves and Loeb (1975) papers. Groves mechanisms are in fact analogous to
Vickrey (1961) and Clarke (1971) mechanisms and identical to Smets (1973) compensation
principle.
9 Theorem 2(a) is proved by Groves-Loeb (1975) and Theorem 2(b) is proved by GreenLaﬀont (1977). Both of them are presented in Groves (1975) and Green-Laﬀont (1976).
10 Proposition 4, p.27, in d’Aspremont–Gérard-Varet (1975) and Theorem 9, p.39, in GreenLaﬀont (1976) demonstrate for diﬀerent particular cases, the impossibility of having a budget
balancing outcome eﬃcient discretionary mechanism.
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In a partial equilibrium approach with only two alternative outcomes, Green
and Laﬀont (1976) assume that the willingness to pay individual values are
randomly sampled from a continuous distribution of a given law.11 With such
an assumption, they show that the budget diﬀerences, in the strongly incentive
compabile mechanism they use, may become negligible in expected value when
the sample size is increased.
In section 4, we shall treat the budget problem in an alternative way by
using the Bayesian approach.

3.3

Almost strictly incentive compatible mechanisms

It is clear from the deﬁnitions that even for incentive compatible mechanisms
there may be other uniform equilibria, for the corresponding game G(m), than
the truth normalized strategy n-tuple â∗ . The simplest way to solve this problem would be to restrict oneself to mechanisms for which â∗ is the only uniform
equilibrium for the game G(m). Without being so restrictive, we deﬁne a mechanism to be almost strictly incentive compatible if and only if: (i) â∗ ∈ E(m),
(ii) ∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, d(â∗ (α)) = d(a∗ (α)). This means that for any other
uniform equilibrium in the game the outcome remains unchanged. Now, we
have the following theorem.
Theorem 3. If H2 holds, then any mechanism which is outcome eﬃcient and
discretionary is almost strictly incentive compatible.
Proof: Suppose m = (d, t) is outcome eﬃcient and discretionary. Then we
have the following three facts:
(1) ∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , Wim (a∗ (α); αi ) = Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi ).
Indeed, since â∗ ∈ ED (m) by theorem 1, we have
∀a∗ ∈ A∗ , ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi ) ≥ Wim (a∗ (α); αi ),
and, by deﬁnition,
∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , Wim (a∗ (α); αi ) ≥ Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi ).
(2) ∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , d(αi , a∗−i (α−i )) = d(a∗ (α)).
Indeed, since m is deﬁned by a discretionary distribution rule, (1) is equivalent
to:

Uj (d(a∗ (α)); a∗j (αj ))
∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , Ui (d(a∗ (α)); αi ) +
=

Ui (d(αi , a∗−i (α−i )); αi )

+



j=i

Uj (d(αi , a∗−i (α−i )); a∗j (αj )).

j=i

Hence, since by H2 the function Ui (x, ai ) +
maximum, we get (2).
11 See

also Green-Kohlberg-Laﬀont (1976).


j=i

Uj (x; a∗j (αj )) has a unique
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(3) ∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, d(a∗ (α)) = d(α).
Indeed, by H2 and (2), ∀a∗ ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , the ﬁrst derivative

DUi (d(a∗ (α)); αi ) = −
DUj (d(a∗ (α)); a∗j (αj )) = DUi (d(a∗ (α)); a∗i (αi )).
j=i
∗

Hence: ∀a ∈ E(m), ∀α ∈ A,


DUi (d(a∗ (α)); αi ) =
DUi (d(a∗ (α)); a∗i (αi )) = 0.
i∈N

i∈N

Therefore, by H2 again, (3) follows.

4

Incentives under the Bayesian Postulate

We want now to turn to the case where for any mechanism m ∈ M the behavior of the individual agents satisﬁes the Bayesian postulate. Accordingly the
relevant standard form of the communication game is Γ(m) which includes the
players’ beliefs. The concept of incentive compatibility may also be reformulated
since each player is now supposed to maximize a mathematical expectation of
his payoﬀs in terms of his subjective probability.

4.1

Bayesian and strongly Bayesian incentive compatible
mechanisms

In a game Γ(m), the message of every player i is going to be determined by
his expected-payoﬀ conditional to αi and relative to the choice of normalized
strategy by every other player. Hence we shall write ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀a∗−i ∈
A∗−i , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,
m
W i (ai , a∗−i ; αi )


=
A−i


=

A−i

Wim (ai , a∗−i (α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi )
[Ui (d(ai , a∗−i (α−i )); αi ) + ti (ai , a∗−i (α−i ))]pi (dα−i |αi ).

In order for such an expression to be well deﬁned we shall add a measurability
restriction (R): every message space must be bounded and measurable and
all the normalized strategies, the decision rules and the transfer schemes are
restricted to be measurable functions.
Under the measurability assumption, we may deﬁne a weaker notion of equilibrium for the communication game.
We shall say that a Bayesian equilibrium for Γ(m) is an n-tuple of normalized
strategies a∗ ∈ A∗ such that
m

m

∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai , W i (ai , a∗−i ; αi ) ≤ W i (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i ; αi ).
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We denote by B(m) the subset in A∗ of all Bayesian equilibria for Γ(m).
Notice that, as in the complete ignorance case (see 3.1), the equilibrium
notion is deﬁned with respect to every possible individual type. Consider the ntuple of normalized strategies â∗ ∈ A∗ (the ‘truth’ strategies) such that: ∀i ∈ N ,
∀αi ∈ Ai , â∗i (αi ) = αi .
We now say of a (measurable) mechanism m that it is Bayesian incentive
compatible if and only if â∗ ∈ B(m). Clearly this is deﬁned by the condition:
∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,
m

m

W i (ai , â∗−i ; αi ) ≤ W i (αi , â∗−i ; αi ).
In other words, for every player i ∈ N and every possible type αi ∈ Ai , sending
as a message this information to the center dominates every other possible message ai ∈ Ai , whenever the other players have presumably the same behavior.
Like in the complete ignorance case a stronger incentive compatible notion
is obtained if such a dominance property has to hold for every player whatever
the behavior of the n − 1 other players. A strategy a∗i ∈ A∗i is dominating for
player i ∈ N if and only if:
m

m

∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai , ∀a∗−i ∈ A∗−i , W i (ai , a∗−i ; αi ) ≤ W i (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i ; αi ).
An n-tuple of strategies a∗ ∈ A∗ dominating for every player is called a strong
Bayesian equilibrium for Γ(m). Let BS (m) be the set of all strong Bayesian
equilibria with respect to m ∈ M . We may now say of a (measurable) mechanism
m that it is strongly Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if â∗ ∈ BS (m),
or:
m

m

∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai , ∀a∗−i ∈ A∗−i , W i (ai , a∗−i ; αi ) ≤ W i (αi , a∗−i ; αi ).
Now it is clear that if a (measurable) mechanism m is strongly incentive
compatible then it is Bayesian incentive compatible. In addition, we have:
Theorem 4. Under Assumption R, a mechanism m is strongly Bayesian incentive compatible if and only if it is strongly incentive compatible.
Proof: (1) Assume m is strongly Bayesian incentive compatible but not
strongly incentive compatible, i.e. ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀a∗i ∈ A∗i , ∀a∗−i ∈ A∗−i ,

A−i

Wim (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i (α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi ) ≤


A−i

Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi ),

but, ∃i ∈ N , ∃αi ∈ Ai , ∃a−i ∈ A−i , ∃ai ∈ Ai such that:
Wim (ai , a−i ; αi ) > Wim (αi , a−i ; αi ).
Now deﬁne: ∀k ∈ N , ∀αk ∈ Ak , a∗k (αk ) = ak . Clearly a∗k ∈ A∗k . Then
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Wim (ai , a−i ; αi ) =
Wim (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i (α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi )
A−i

m
∗
Wi (αi , a−i (α−i ); αi )p(dα−i |αi ) = Wim (αi , a−i ; αi ),
≤
A−i

which is a contradiction.
(2) Assume m is strongly incentive compatible; then ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai ,
∀a∗i ∈ A∗i , ∀a∗−i ∈ A∗−i ,
Wim (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i (α−i ); αi ) ≤ Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi ), ∀α−i ∈ A−i .
Hence


Wim (a∗i (αi ), a∗−i (α−i ); αi )p(dα−i |αi ) ≤
A−i

A−i

Wim (αi , a∗−i (α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi ),

and m is strongly Bayesian incentive compatible.
As a corollary, we may get a theorem analogous to theorem 3 since we know,
by theorem 2(b), that every strongly incentive compatible mechanism, which is
outcome eﬃcient, is discretionary.
Corollary 1. If H2 and R hold, then any mechanism m which is outcome
eﬃcient and strongly Bayesian incentive compatible is almost strictly incentive
compatible.

4.2

Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms and a solution to the budget problem

For any distribution mechanism satisfying R, we say that the associated distribution rule f is subjectively discretionary if and only if: ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai ,
∀ai ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,


fi (ai , α−i )pi (dα−i |αi ) =
fi (ai , α−i )pi (dα−i |αi ).
A−t

A−i

A subjectively discretionary mechanism is a distribution mechanism for which
the associated distribution rule is subjectively discretionary. In contrast with
discretionary distribution rules, the restriction introduced here on f imposes
only that, for every i ∈ N , the expected value of fi must be constant with
respect to i’s messages.
The interest we have for the class of subjective discretionary mechanisms
comes not only from the fact that it includes the class of discretionary mechanisms, but also because it is included in the class of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms as shown by the next result paralleling Theorem 2a.
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Theorem 5. Under Assumptions H1 and R, any mechanism m ∈ M which is
outcome eﬃcient and subjectively discretionary is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof: By Assumption R the individual payoﬀs are well-deﬁned. We want to
show that for the mechanism m:
m

m

∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai , W i (ai , â∗−i ; αi ) ≤ W i (αi , â∗−i ; αi ).

(1)

Since m is outcome eﬃcient: ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , ∀Ai ∈ Ai ,


Ui (d(α); αi ) +
Uj (d(α); αj ) ≥ Ui (d(ai , α−i ); αi ) +
Uj (d(ai , α−i ); αj ),
j∈N
j=i

j∈N
j=i

which implies:


Ui (d(α); αi )pi (dα−i |αi ) +
A−i

A−i j=i




≥

A−i



Ui (d(ai , α−i ); αi )pi (dα−i |αi ) +

Uj (d(α); αj )pi (dα−i |αi )



A−i j=i

Uj (d(ai , α−i ); αj )pi (dα−i |αi ).

Since m is subjectively discretionary:∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,


fi (αi , α−i )pi (dα−i |αi ) =
fi (ai , α−i )pi (dα−i |αi ).
A−i

(2)

(3)

A−i

Clearly, in light of (3), (2) is equivalent to (1).

We now want to study the balanced budget problem. The ﬁrst result we
have concerning this problem uses a strong assumption on the various beliefs of
the individual players, called the independence condition.12 It requires that for
every player i:
def
∀αi ∈ Ai , ∀αi ∈ Ai , pi (·|αi ) = pi (·|αi ) = πi (·) .
This condition is, in terms of information, very restrictive since it implies in fact
that the true beliefs of any agent is of common knowledge.
Theorem 6. Let H and R hold. If the independence condition is satisﬁed, then
the mechanism m = (d, t), where d is any outcome eﬃcient decision rule and t
is such that, ∀i ∈ N , ∀a ∈ A,



ti (a) =
Uj (d(a); aj ) πi (da−i )
A−i

−

j=i

1 
n−1
j=i


A−j




Uk (d(a); ak ) πj (da−j )

k=j

12 It has been shown in d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1975) that a converse theorem to
theorem 5 holds if the independence condition holds.
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is both budget balancing and Bayesian incentive compatible.

Proof: By construction i∈N ti (·) = 0, hence m is budget balancing. Also we
may rewrite m as the following distribution mechanism:

Uj (d(a); aj ) − gi (ai ) + g−i (a−i ),
∀i ∈ N , ∀a ∈ A, fi (a) =
j=i



where
gi (ai ) =

A−i




Uj (d(a); aj ) πi (da−i )

j=i

and
g−i (a−i ) =

1 
gj (aj ).
n−1
j=i

Then we have: ∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , ∀ai ∈ Ai ,


fi (ai , α−i )πi (dα−i ) =
A−i

A−i

g−i (α−i )πi (dα−i ),

which is a constant. Hence m is subjectively discretionary and so Bayesian
incentive compatible by theorem 5.

Since the independence condition is a very restrictive suﬃcient condition it
seems important to establish whether or not it is also necessary for the result
of theorem 6 to hold. In this paper we answer this question only in the ﬁnite
case. Indeed, in that case, we may show that the result of theorem 6 holds for
a much larger class than the class of independent beliefs.
Let, for every i ∈ N , the set Ai be ﬁnite and for every αi ∈ Ai , pi (·|αi ) be a
discrete probability of full support over A−i . For the following let also: ∀i ∈ N ,
def
def
Ci = {(ai , αi ) ∈ Ai × Ai : αi = ai }, and Λ = {λ = (λ1 , · · · , λi , · · · , λn ):
Ci
∀i ∈ N , λi ∈ R+ }. The compatibility condition we use in the next theorem can
be written as:
∀κ ∈ RA , if κ = 0 then there is no λ ∈ Λ such that, ∀i ∈ N , ∀α ∈ A,


λi (αi , ai ) = κ(α) +
λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ).
pi (α−i |αi )
ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

That this new condition is implied by the independence condition is immediate.
In addition, the following example ensures easily that the converse does not
hold. For n = 2, let p1 and p2 satisfy: ∀α1 ∈ A1 , ∃α2 ∈ A2 such that
(i)
and

∀a1 ∈ A1 , a1 = α1 , p1 (α2 |a1 ) > p1 (α2 |α1 )
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∀a2 ∈ A2 , a2 = α2 , p2 (α1 |a2 ) < p2 (α1 |α2 ).

Indeed for any κ ∈ RA such that κ(α) = 0, for some α ∈ A, and for any λ ∈ Λ
such that:
p1 (α2 |α1 )



λ1 (α1 , a1 ) −

a1 ∈A1
a1 =α1



λ1 (α1 , a1 )p1 (α2 |a1 ) = κ(α) = 0,

a1 ∈A1
a1 =α1

we must have


λ1 (α1 , a1 ) > 0.

a1 ∈A1
a1 =α1

Hence for α2 such that (α1 , α2 ) satisﬁes (i) and (ii) we get:
p1 (α2 |α1 )





λ1 (α1 , a1 ) −

a1 ∈A1
a1 =α1

λ1 (α1 , a1 )p1 (α2 |a1 ) < 0,

a1 ∈A1
a1 =α1

and
p2 (α1 |α2 )





λ2 (α2 , a2 ) −

a2 ∈A2
a2 =α2

λ2 (α2 , a2 )p2 (α1 |a2 ) ≥ 0.

a2 ∈A2
a2 =α2

We can now state our last theorem:
Theorem 7. Let H hold and, for every i ∈ N , let Ai be ﬁnite and pi be discrete.
If the compatibility condition is satisﬁed, then there exists an outcome eﬃcient
mechanism which is both budget balancing and Bayesian incentive compatible.
Proof: Let d be any outcome eﬃcient decision rule. For every i ∈ N , we write:
def
∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ui (a; αi ) = Ui (d(a); αi )
and
def
∀ai ∈ Ai , ∀αi ∈ Ai , ui (ai , αi ) =



[ui (ai , α−i ; αi )−ui (αi , α−i ; αi )]pi (α−i |αi ).

α−i ∈A−i

Consider the following system of linear inequalities where z ∈ RnA is taken as
variable:

1 
[zi (αi , α−i ) −
zj (αi , α−i )
∀i ∈ N , ∀(ai , αi ) ∈ Ci ,
n−1
α−i ∈A−i

−zi (ai , α−i ) +

1
n−1


j=i

j=i

zj (ai , α−i )]pi (α−i |αi ) ≥ ui (ai , αi ).

(1)
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Clearly if the system (1) has a solution z ∈ RnA then the mechanism m = (d, t),
where,
1 
def
zj (a),
∀a ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , ti (a) = zi (a) −
n−1
j=i

is both budget balancing and Bayesian incentive compatible. Thus we have to
show that the system (1) is consistent. The proof is divided into three steps.
Step 1. ∀λ ∈ Λ, if


∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , pi (α−i |αi )



λi (ai , αi ) =

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ), (2)

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

then




λi (ai , αi )ui (ai , αi ) ≤ 0.

(3)

i∈N (ai ,αi )∈Ci

Proof of step 1. Since d is outcome eﬃcient, we have, ∀i ∈ N , ∀αi ∈ Ai ,
∀ai ∈ Ai ,


ui (ai , αi ) ≤



α−i ∈A−i

uj (αi , α−i ; αj ) −

j=i




uj (ai , α−i ; αj ) pi (α−i |αi ).

j=i

This implies that for any λ ∈ Λ we get:




λi (ai , αi )ui (ai , αi )

i∈N (ai ,αi )∈Ci

≤

 






 

uj (αi , α−i ; αj )pi (α−i |αi ) 
λi (ai , αi )

i∈N αi ∈A α−i ∈A−i j=i

−

 





i∈N ai ∈Ai α−i ∈A−i j=i

 



ai ∈Ai
ai =αi







uj (ai ; α−i ; αj ) 
λi (ai , αi )pi (α−i |αi ) =
αi ∈Ai
αi =ai




uj (αi , α−i ; αj )  pi (α−i |αi )

i∈N α∈A j=i





λi (ai , αi ) −

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi




λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ) .

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

Assuming (2) we get (3).
Step 2. ∀λ ∈ Λ, if
 
∀z ∈ RnA ,
i∈N (ai ,αi )∈Ci

λi (ai , αi )


α−i ∈A−i


zi (αi , α−i ) −

1 
zj (αi , α−i )
n−1
j=i
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1 
zj (ai , α−i ) pi (α−i |αi ) = 0,
n−1

−zi (ai , α−i ) +

(4)

j=i

then, ∃κ ∈ RA such that :


∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , pi (α−i |αi )

λi (ai , αi ) −

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi



λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ) = κ(α).

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

(5)
Proof of step 2. Take z ∈ RnA such that for some k ∈ N and α0 ∈ A we have
zk (α0 ) > 0 and ∀j = k, ∀α = α0 , zj (α0 ) = 0. Then, by (4), we get:


0
zk (α0 ) pk (α−k
|αk0 )

λk (ak , αk0 ) −

i=k

ak ∈Ak
ak =α0
k



−


1 
0
pi (α−i
|αi0 )
λi (ai , αi0 )
n−1
a ∈A

0
λk (αk0 , αk )pk (α−k
|αk ) +

1  
0
λi (αi0 , αi )pi (α−i
|αi ) = 0
n−1
α ∈A
i=k

αk ∈Ak
αk =α0
k

i
i
ai =α0
i

i
i
αi =α0
i

or, equivalently,
0
pk (α−k
|αk0 )



λk (ak , αk0 ) −

ak ∈Ak
ak =α0
k

1
n

=





0
λk (αk0 , αk )pk (α−k
|αk )

αk ∈Ak
αk =α0
k

0
pi (α−i
|αi0 )

i



λi (ai , αi0 ) −

 
i

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

0
λi (αi0 , αi )pi (α−i
|αi ) .

αi ∈Ai
αi =α0
i

Since the same argument holds for every k ∈ N and every α0 ∈ A, we may
conclude that (4) implies (5).
Step 3. By the compatitibility condition, for any λ ∈ Λ, (5) implies (2).
Proof of step 3. First we note that if λ ∈ Λ satisﬁes (5), then ∀i ∈ N ,
∀α ∈ A,


λi (ai , αi ) −
λi (αi , ai ) =
ai ∈Ai
ai =αi









λi (ai , αi ) −
λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ) =
pi (α−i |αi )


α−i ∈A−i


=

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi


a−i ∈A−i

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi



κ(α−i , αi )

a−i ∈A−i

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi







pj (α−j |αj )
 = 0.
λ
(a
,
α
)
−
λ
(α
,
a
)p
(α
|a
)
j
j
j
j
j
j
j
−j
j


aj ∈Aj
aj =αj

aj ∈Aj
aj =αj
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Now suppose that λ ∈ Λ is such that (5) holds but not (2). Then ∃κ ∈ RA
∀α ∈ A, ∀i ∈ N , pi (α−i |αi )


ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

λi (αi , ai ) −



λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ) = κ(α),

ai ∈Ai
ai =αi

but κ = 0. But this contradicts the compatibility condition.
In summary, we thus get that, for any λ ∈ Λ, (4) implies (5) (by step 2),
(5) implies (2) (by step 3) and (2) implies (3) (by step 1). Hence, ∀λ ∈ Λ, (4)
implies (3). But this is a well-known suﬃcient condition for system (1) to be
consistent [see for example Fan (1956, theorem 1)].

The compatibility condition and the argument of theorem 7 can be stated
for the general class of beliefs we have been considering previously. However to
get a theorem analogous to theorem 7 we need to introduce an assumption like
H2 (instead of H1 ) and to use some representation theorem of functionals in
terms of conjugate spaces. We propose to discuss this matter elsewhere.

5

Conclusion

The main contribution of this paper is to show that by using the Bayesian approach to incomplete information, one may ﬁnd mechanisms to solve eﬃciently a
collective decision problem, which ensure simultaneously incentive compatibility
and budget equilibrium. This positive result however relies on a compatibility
condition which is imposed on the beliefs of the agents. Whether this condition
is not only suﬃcient but also necessary remains an open question the answer to
which would give a corresponding impossibility result.
The compatibility condition includes, as a particular case, the requirement
of independence of the players’ beliefs with respect to their own type. This
independence condition implies that all players’ beliefs are fully known. However, one can also consider it as associated to a statistical experiment, as Green,
Laﬀont and Kohlberg (1976, p.384) who ‘assume that each of the individuals in
the society believes that all of the others are drawn indepently from a normal
population with zero mean’.13 More generally, on the basis of some preliminary
empirical evidence, all agents may agree on some class of individual beliefs satisfying some compatibility condition and ask the central agency to reject any
announcement outside this restricted class.

13 With this assumption and in a public good model where, under their proposed mechanism
the collected taxes are distributed equally to all players, the authors show that the best reply
(in expectations) of each player and for each type, in the communication game, approaches
the truth as the number of players increases.
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